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CARRIuzs-Loss OF BAG;AGE-LIMITATION OF L IATy.HAiuus v.
SouTHmN Ry. Co., 85 S. E. (S. S.) 158.-The Interstate Commerce Com-
mission requires notices of rates and charges filed with it by the rail-
roads to be placed in the stations. Held, although no such notice was
posted by the defendant, an interstate passenger checking a trunk
without specifying its value can recover no more than the amount limited
in the schedule in case of its destruction.
As early as 1838, it was held by the Supreme Court of New York
that a common carrier could not excuse himself from liability by public
notice. Hollister v. Nowlen, i9 Wend. (N. Y.) 234; Cole v. Goodwin,
id. 251. But a common carrier could at common law limit his liability
by express contract. Swindler v. Hilliard, 2 Rich. (S. C.) 286; Bernard
v. Adams Ex. Co., 205 Mass. 254. Acceptance of a ticket or bill of
lading containing a limitation provision, has been held to constitute
assent to the limitation by the passenger or shipper accepting the same.
Carr v. Tex. & Pac. Ry., 194 U. S. 427; Schaller v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry., 97 Wis. 31. Some states, however, require the actual consent of
the shipper or passenger to the limitation. Black v. Atlantic Coast Line,
82 S. C. 478; Plaff v. Pac. Express Co., 251 Ill. 243. The more recent
decisions show that if a railroad has filed rates and charges with the
Interstate Commerce Commission, there need be no actual knowledge
or assent by the passenger to limit the carrier's liability. L. & N. Ry.
v. Miller, 156 Ky. 677; Barstow v. N. Y., N. H. & H., 143 N. Y. S.
983; Boston & Maine v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97 (Pitney dissenting). The
holding in the principal case goes further than the latter cases, in that
it allows the limitation of liability even though the defendant had not
posted schedules in its stations as required by the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
S. H. S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-I4TH AMENDMENT--POLICE POWERs-SEGREGATION
ORDINANcE.-HARRIs v. CITY OF LOUISVILLE, 177 S. W. (Ky.) 472.-Held,
an ordinance which provided for the segregation of races in the city of
Louisville, and which contained a clause providing that nothing therein
should affect present vested rights, was a valid exercise of the police
powers, and not contrary to the 14th amendment of the Constitution of
the United States.
The preservation of public health and safety is often made in express
terms a matter of municipal duty. i Dillon, Municipal Corporations, §144.
The State may give to the municipal corporation the general power to
pass ordinances in regard to public welfare. Pool v. Trexler, 76 N. C. 297.
§2783 of the Ky. Statutes provides that "the General Council shall have
power to pass, for the government of the city, any ordinance not in
conflict with the constitution of the U. S., the constitution of Ky. and the
statutes thereof." In Munn v. Illinois, 94 S. 113, Mr. Chief Justice Waite,
in referring to police powers, said, "Under these powers the government
regulates the conduct of its citizens, one toward another, and the manner
in which each shall use his own property when such regulation becomes
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necessary for the public good." Rights of property, like all other social
and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations,
restraints, and regulations, established by law, as the legislature may think
necessary and expedient. Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53;
Deems v. Mayor, go Md. 164; Barbier v. Connoflly, 113 U. S. 27. Quaran-
tine ordinances and ordinances for the segregation of prostitutes have
been held constitutional. Smith v. St. Louis & S. W. R. R. Co., 181 U. S.
248; L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U. S. 587. Legislation preventing inter-
marriage between the two races, and providing for separate compartments
in railroad coaches, and establishing separate schools for whites and blacks,
has been universally held valid. State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389; Plessey v.
Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537; Berea College v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 2o9.
An ordinance similar to the one in the principal case was held valid in
the case of Ashland v. Coleman in the Circuit Court of Hanover County,
Va. In the following cases segregation ordinances were declared uncon-
stitutional, but the ordinances pissed upon are distinguishable from the
one in the principal case. State v. Gurry, 121 Md. 534; State v. Darnell,
166 N. C. 3oo; Carey v. Atlanta, 84 S. E. (Ga.) 456.
S. H. S.
DAMAGES-PER-MANENT oR TEMPORARY INJURIES-FLOODED LAND-
MEAsuRE op REcovERY.-THomPsoN V. ILLINOis CENTRAL R. CO., 153 N. W.
(IowA) 174-In case of an overflow of land due to the faulty location
of a railroad bridge, held, that damages should have been confined to
the lowlands physically sustaining the injury and not extended to the
depreciation in value of the farm as a whole.
It is well settled in the case of permanent structures that the measure
of damages is the difference between the value of the land before and
after the injury. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Herkert, io8 Ill. App. 582.
Whether a particular injury is permanent or temporary is a much
controverted point. See Flouring Mill Co. v. Lake Shore R. Co., 16o
Mich. 330. Sometimes the question is made to depend upon the inten-
tion with which the structure was erected (Strange v. Railroad, 245 Ill.
246), or the right to be maintained. Railroad v. Horan, 131 Ill. 288;
Strout v. Railroad, 157 Ky. i. A permanent structure is defined sometimes
as one of such a character that unless interfered with by the hand of
man it will continue indefinitely. Gartner v. Railroad, 71 Neb. 444. Again,
the question has been determined with reference to the ease or difficulty of
removal. Baker v. Allen, 66 Ark. 271. Under any of these tests the
structure in the principal case should be regarded as permanent. Where
the convenience and salability of an entire farm are permanently
affected by the flooding of a part, the damage to the entire farm should
be recovered. Hastings v. Railroad, 148 Iowa 39o; Parrott v. Railroad,
127 Iowa 424; Reichert v. Bachenstross, 71 Hun (N. Y.) 546; Rourke
v. Mass. Electric Co., 177 Mass. 46. On the other hand, the damage has
been regarded as temporary owing to the temporary character of the
immediate injury, notwithstanding the liability of indefinite recurrence
thereof on account of the permanency of the structure. Jones v. Sanitary
Dist. of Chicago, 252 Ill. 591; Sloss-Sheflield Steel & Iron Co. v. Mitchell,
61 So. (Ala.) 934. In viewing the authorities one is led to form the
opinion that the courts in assessing damages consider the damage to the
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whole tract rather than the damage to that part physically sustaining the
injury alone. This is contrary to the holding of the majority of the
judges in the principal case.
J. McD.
DAMAGES-PERSONAL INJURIEs-LOss OF PROFITS.-MAHONEY V. BOSTON
ELEVATED Ry., io8 N. E. (MASS.) l033.-In an action for personal injuries,
held, that one who is engaged in a commercial activity involving the
employment of others, may not show in evidence a diminution of profits
coincident with his inability to attend to his affairs.
The consideration of profits lost as an element of damage resolves itself
into a question of certainty of proof. Griffli v. Colver, I6 N. Y. 489.
First, the fact of loss may be purely conjectural. Martin v. Deetz, 102
Cal. 55 (new business-frustrated attempt at incorporation). Second, data
may be insufficient to warrant the inference of a causal connection between
the injury and the loss. Bierbach v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 54 Wis. 208
(nothing to prevent the employment of a substitute during the disability) ;
Wallace v. Penn. Ry. Co., 195 Pa. 127 (injury to boarding-house keeper,
loss of custom). Third, the extent of the loss may be uncertain. Uncer-
tainty of either of the first two species is decisive against the admissibility
of proffered evidence. Cases supra. It is sufficient, however, to have a
substantial basis for a probable opinion. Hetzel v. Ry., i69 U. S. 26
(prospective profits from use of land injured); Hanover Ry. Co. v. Coyle,
53 Pa. 396 (injury to peddler, purely personal activity) ; Walter v. Post,
4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 382 (injury to place of business). In general,
ordinary profits incident to a regular established business are not too
speculative. Goebel v. Hough, 26 Minn. 252. By the better view, in
actions of tort at least, mere uncertainty as to the quantum of damage
will not exclude an item from consideration. Allison v. Chandler, iI Mich.
542; Gildersleeve v. Overstolz, go Mo. App. 518. Contra, Coyle v. Ry. Co.,
18 Pa. Super. Ct. 235. Courts have accordingly sometimes admitted the
evidence, even in the case of a personal injury to one engaged in a
commercial occupation. Terre Haute v. Hudmut, 112 Ind. 542; Ry. Co.
v. Scheinkoenig, 62 Kan. 57. The great weight of authority, however,
supports the principal case in rigidly drawing the line between pursuits
consisting solely or substantially of personal activity, and commercial
occupations involving the employment of labor and capital. Lombardi v.
St. Ry. Co., 124 Cal. 311; Masterton v. Mt. Vernon, 58 N. Y. 391; Cin-
cinnati v. Evans, 5 Ohio St. 594. The infinite variations of fact inter-
mediate between the position of the mere investor of capital and that of
one engaged in a purely personal activity demand a more elastic and
open-minded treatment, under the liberal doctrine of Allison v. Chandler,
supra.
C. R. W.
EVIDENCE-RELEVANCY-VALUE OF PROPERTY.-JONESBOao L. C. AND E.
Ry. Co. V. AsirABANNER, 174 S. W. (ARK.) 548.-Held, that a statement
of an owner of land that she had been offered a specified sum per acre
for it was not competent as evidence of value.
According to the weight of authority, testimony of an offer to purchase
land is inadmissible to show its value. Minn. Ry. Transfer Co. v. Gluek,
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45 Minn. 463; Atkinson v. Chicago Ry. Co., 93 Wis. 362; Fowler v. Mid-
dlesex, 88 Mass. 92. The rule is the contrary, however, where the wit-
ness testifies as to the price at which he offered the property for sale.
City of Findlay v. Pertz, 74 Fed. 681; Grand Rapids v. Widdicomb, 92
Mich. 92. The same result is reached where there is evidence of the
price put on a commodity by an agent appointed to sell it. Banks v.
Gidrot, ig Ga. 421. Many cases, however, are opposed to the ruling of
the principal case. Curran v. McGrath, 67 Ill. App. 566; Faust v. Hosford,
I19 Ia. 97. The theory on which the evidence is excluded is that it is
so open to suspicion and inviting to fraud, that it is inadmissible. Perkins
v. People, 27 Mich. 386. Undoubtedly such defects could be brought out
on cross examination and on principle it would seem as though the
testimony should be admitted, particularly since the market price of land
may be proved by the opinions, based in part on hearsay, of witnesses.
J. C.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-INJURY TO TENANT-DUTY OF LANDLORD.-S31EA
V. McEvoy, 107 N. E. (MASS.) 945.-Held, where a landlord furnishes a
dumb-waiter for the use of tenants in common, he is bound to keep it in
as good repair for the benefit of the tenants as it was when their
tenancy began.
There is no duty upon a landlord to make repairs on the leased premises,
in the absence of a covenant to do so. Logan v. Langan, 145 Ky. 599;
Soucy v. Louis Obert Brewing Co., i8o Ill. App. 69. But this general rule
is modified in most jurisdictions so that where, as in the principal case,
the premises are rented to a number of tenants, the landlord is bound to
keep in repair that portion of the premises which is used by all the
tenants, such as stairs, hallway, elevators, etc., and which he is said to
have kept under his control. Trego v. Rubovits, 178 Ill. App. 127; Wilcox
v. Zane, 167 Mass. 302; Dollard v. Roberts, I3O N. Y. 269; McGinley v.
Alliance Trust Co., 168 Mo. 257. But the landlord must have actual or
constructive notice of the defect. Brooks v. Schlernitzauer, 1i3 N. Y.
Supp. 484. In Minnesota the landlord was held not bound to repair a
common roof except to prevent its becoming a nuisance. Kruger v. Per-
rant, 29 Minn. 385. Where a stairway in a tenement house, occupied by
several tenants, is rendered unsafe by merely temporary causes such as
snow and ice, in some states the landlord is not liable to a tenant using
it with knowledge of the defect. Purcell v. English, 86 Ind. 34. A land-
lord is not liable for an injury from a defect in premises in common use
of tenants, and under his control, where the defect existed and was
patent at the time of letting. Dowling v. Nuebling, 97 Wis. 350; Freeman
v. Hunnewell, 163 Mass. 21o. But he is liable even though the defect
was not obvious, if it existed at the time of letting. Andrews v. Wil-
liamson, 193 Mass. 92. The principal case seems correct.
S. H. S.
NEGLIGENCE-INJURIES TO CHILDREN-DANGEROUS PREMISE.-CIrESKO
ET AL. v. DELAWARE & HUDSON CO., 218 Fed. 8o4.-Held, that where a boy
six years old wandered from the street into the defendant's machine
shop through an open, unguarded gateway he was too young to be a
trespasser and the defendant owed him a duty of care.
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It is a rule of the common law that the owner of property is liable
for the negligent use of it as to all who are lawfully on the premises
but not as to those who are there without right or without permission.
The rule is usually expressed by saying that there is no affirmative duty
to exercise care toward a trespasser-the owner of the property must
only refrain from wilful injury. Baker v. Byrne, 58 Barb. 438; Elliott
v. Carlson, 54 I1. App. 47o; Rooney v. Woolworth, 74 Conn. 72o. But
there are decisions which except from the general rule all cases where
children are injured by reason of the maintenance on private property
of "an attractive nuisance'---that is, one which from its nature, location,
and inherent dangerous character is likely to attract and injure irrespon-
sible children. It started and has had its most frequent application in
the case of railroad turntables. Sioux City and P. R. Co. v. Stout, 17
Wall, 657; Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Fox, 38 Ind. App. 268; Barrett v. So,
Pacific Co., 91 Cal. 296. These cases proceed on one of three theories -
that a child of tender years can not be a trespasser, that the attraction
amounts to an invitation, or that as to such a child the attraction is a
wilfully concealed danger. All of these grounds have been entirely
repudiated in some jurisdictions. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Reich,
6I N. J. L. 635; Frost v. Eatern R. Co., 64 N. H. 220; Daniels v. N. Y.
& N. E. R. Co., 154 Mass. 349; Wilmot v. McPadden, 79 Conn. 367.
These cases hold that temptation is not such invitation as will excuse
a trespass and that the duty of protecting children is on their parents
and not on the owners of property. The majority rule would seem to
favor the attractive nuisance doctrine in all cases of machinery or devices
which would tend to attract children, though generally restricted to cases
of ponds, holes, cisterns or structures like barns or railroad stations.
The doctrine never applies where the owner of the property could not
carry on his lawful business in the necessary and ordinary manner and
at the same time take precautions against trespassing children. Chicago
etc. R. Co. v. Fox, supra. In the principal case the age of the child,
the dangerous character of the machinery, and its location only a few
feet from a much-traveled street bring it well within a conservative
application of the attractive nuisance doctrine.
V. L. K.
NEGLIGENCE-LEGAL CAUSE-SPREADING FiREs.-DAvis ET AL. v. DEL.
L. & W. Ry. Co., iog N. M (N. Y.) 95.-Held, that although a railroad can
not be held for a loss caused to one proprietor communicated by way of
the premises of another, it is liable in the case of a fire spreading from
one building to another on the premises of a single proprietor.
By the established rule of New York, recovery for loss from the
spread of fire is limited to the premises adjacent to those of the defendant.
Ryan v. Ry. Co., 35 N. Y. 210; Van Iwegen v. Ry. Co., 165 N. Y. 625.
Accord, Ry. Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. 353. Other authorities are agreed only
to the extent of repudiating this arbitrary limitation. Ry. Co. v. Barker,
94 Ky. 71; Ry. Co. v. Gantt, 39 Md. 115; Johnson. v. Ry. Co., 31 Minn.
57. The judicial language in some instances points to an unlimited
liability, whatever the duration and extent of the conflagration, in the
absence of an extraordinary, active, intervening agency. See Ry. Co. v.
Stamford, 12 Kan. 354; Ry. Co. v. Wilbach, 113 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.
1908) 318. According to other opinions, however, the intervening cause
may be merely negative, such as an extraordinary failure, whether culpable
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or otherwise, of a counteracting agency, such as in the natural and prob-
able course of events would have been evoked to meet the situation.
Doggett v. Ry. Co., 78 N. C. 305 (ample opportunity to check conflagra-
tion; extraordinary failure to do so). See Phillips v. Ry. Co., 138 N. C.
12, 20. Cf. Ry. Co. v. Barrett, 78 Miss. 432 (time and distance proper
elements to be considered in determining proximateness or remoteness);
Henry v. Ry. Co., 5o Cal. 176 (distinguishing cases of city block and
of open field); Ry. Co. v. Westover, 4 Neb. 268 (emphasizing rapidity
of conflagration); Hoffian v. King, 16o N. Y. 618 (emphasizing length
of time between negligence and loss). The majority of cases intimate
nothing as to the possibility of negative as well as positive intervening
causes. Ry. Co. v. Salmon, 39 N. J. L. 299; Ry. Co. v. Hope, go Pa.
St. 373. The North Carolina doctrine of negative intervening cause is in
harmony with either the "foreseeable" test, or the test of "natural
and proximate sequence," as a criterion of legal causal relation. By
removing the possibility of unlimited liability, it would destroy the main
argument for the illogical rule obliquely recognized in the principal case.
C. R. W.
WAR-EFFECT ON EXISTING CONTRACTS AND REMEDIES-CONTRACT RIGHTS
AND REMEDIES OF ALIEN ENEMIEs-BILL FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN A
NEuTRAL FoRum.-ComPAGNI UNIVERSELLE DE TLEGRAPHiC ET DE TELE-
PHONIC SANS FIL v. UNITED STATES SERVICE CORPORATION, 95 ATL. (N. J.)
187.-Held, on a bill for specific performance by a. company of one
belligerent nation against a company of another belligerent, that statutes
of the respective nations prohibiting such performance did not forbid
institution of suit or its defense, that the ground of aid to an alien
enemy failed, that comity required that a neutral court be open to the
litigants, and that chancery would grant the degree. Where one nation
is at war with another, all subjects or citizens of one are deemed in
hostility to citizens of the other and they have no capacity to contract
between each other. Scholefield v. Eichelberger, 32 U. S. (7 Pet.) 586;
White v. Burnley, 61 U. S. (2o How.) 235. And property engaged in
trade with the enemy is subject to confiscation. The Rapid, Fed. Cas.
No. 11576, 12 U. S. (8 Cranch) 155. But a joint owner of personalty in
an enemy's country during a war may use part of his property to bribe
enemy officers to save the remainder from destruction. Coogan v. U. S.,
7 Ct. Cl. 51o. As to a contract made previous to a declaration of war,
judicial enforcement in the countries at war is suspended, if the nature of
the contract permits; but its obligation does not cease, and the remedy
revives with the restoration of peace. Semmes v. Fire Ins. Co., 8o
U. S. (13 Wall.) 158; Watts, Watts & Co. v. Unione Austriaca de
Navigazione, 224 Fed. 188. Contra; Isaacs v. McGrath, 2 McCord (S. C.)
26 (holding that war ends all executory contracts between citizens of
belligerent nations). The interesting feature of the principal case is that
it apparently is without direct precedent in considering the enforcement in
a neutral forum of a contract between belligerents made previous to the
war. The reason which moves a belligerent court to prohibit performance-
that the enemy may not be benefited-does not apply to a neutral court,
and consideration for the patriotic motives of the contestants must not
be allowed to stand in the way of the execution of justice. S. B.
